Yes, seems a bit of a gap between US and Iranian opinions on the state of the strait. US says "open it", while Iran has for some time claimed it is open - only subject to conditions. Then, as you mention, the Israelis talk of an end to the blockade.
I foresee a possible relaxation of conditions on the strait by Iran while keeping their hand on the lever providing substantial leverage during any actual negotiations. I also note that it seems the US are considering Iranian demands - not the other way around. Even with that, Trumps' toughest negotiations may be with the Israelis.
A not-unlikely outcome in this war is the fall of many gulf monarchies. A great outcome for some. A terrible outcome for others (such as Israel and the US).
I haven't seen imagery of damage to Israeli airbases, but plenty of imagery showing damage to US military bases. e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0cIOMVBSbU . Worth keeping in mind that in the case of Israel, censorship is very effective.
From the Iranian perspective, the overall strategy seems to have been:
1. Deplete intercepter stock and probe US/Israeli defences using large amounts of older less accurate missile stock and waves of drones.
2. Target radar and early warning systems.
3. After 'blinding', make further use of more vulnerable but cheaper and more accurate drones to target specific infrastructure.
Given this approach it makes total sense to see their 'rate of fire' reduced by 90%. This is not necessarily an indication of reduced ability to launch attacks - their attacks are now more effective. They have demonstrated that each time the US and Israel escalate they successfully respond almost immediately. Talk of their capabilities being wiped out is demonstrably nonsense.
Ted Postol makes much the same points. He also claims to be surprised by the accuracy of recent missiles launched by Iran and assumes that his earlier analysis underestimated this because it was done based on the older stock Iran was using.
It seems pretty clear to me that Israel and the US are on the back foot here. Defences are inadequate. Economic pressure is building. Iran still has plenty of options to increase pressure (e.g. Houthi involvement, further infrastructure targeting, additional constrictions on the strait of Hormuz). By comparison US ability to increase pressure now seems limited to threatening major war crimes (wiping out Iran's power grid and putting the country into blackout). Not to say many of Iran's actions haven't also been war crimes.
How much more damage can Iran accept? Nobody is about to be voted out of power there so I would think quite a bit (as unpleasant as that is for the millions of innocent people caught up in this madness). I think the truth of all of this is that the US and Israel have no way to wipe out Iran's missile and drone capabilities. Postol even suggests nukes wouldn't even accomplish that. So now what? Taco or push further for Iranian political unrest or division.
My feeling is that this is going to get a lot worse for everyone involved.
I suspect you're giving the Iranian response too much foresight and credit here. With the decapitation strike, it's unlikely that a coherent plan of "launch all the cheap stuff first" remained intact. The upside of decentralized control is that it's hard to shut down; the downside is that it's hard to do exactly this kind of coordination.
My guess (which seems to be borne out by the numbers, at least as gets reported) is that the bulk of the IRGC's missile capability has been launched already. Certainly not all, but it will continue to diminish over time rather than increase. Still, that doesn't mean the remaining stock isn't incredibly dangerous.
> My feeling is that this is going to get a lot worse for everyone involved.
If Iran was having great success with their attacks, they wouldn't therefore tail off the intensity if they could help it. They would just start scoring more hits with the same, presumably maximum, rate of fire.
I think the obvious answer is the correct one here, that Iran's launch capacity has been degraded. That's not to say it will ever go to zero, so a lot of your other points still have some merit.
> f Iran was having great success with their attacks, they wouldn't therefore tail off the intensity if they could help it.
They would for pragmatical reasons - they do not want to spend more ammunition then necessary. They very clearly do eye for eye thing - when something is attacked inside their territory, they attack similar thing outside.
They are not running the "operation epic fury to prove we are manly men" thing. They are running the "operation regime survives in a long term" thing.
That assumes they want to escalate. So far at least their official statements have been clear about tit-for-tat.
It could also backfire spectacularly. If a bunch of civilians suddenly get killed or other war crimes committed unilaterally by them (such as targeting energy infrastructure) their adversaries could gain political support for the current effort. Whereas gradually forcing all interceptors to be expended is a massively expensive slow bleed and gives the opponent little to nothing to spin in their favor.
The strategy of throwing ballistic missiles at all of their neighbors doesn't seem like one that's overly concerned with political support among their adversaries. And a fast bleed of interceptors works for them too, maybe better since it spends less time in this phase of the conflict. I don't buy it. The Iranians aren't stupid but I don't think they're playing 5d chess either.
I agree that it's probably not 5D chess. But I have to contest that speed is to their advantage given such asymmetric military strength. A slow bleed prolongs the process while the world looks on and energy prices steadily rise. They certainly aren't endearing themselves with their neighbors but at the same time by only striking a minimum amount of infrastructure they avoid mobilizing the sentiment of the broader US or EU populations against them.
My impression is that an overly intense or otherwise disproportionate attack would risk inviting a significant increase in political support. Whereas so far it seems to be a wildly unpopular military campaign.
IMO the US botched this quite badly. I'm almost certain we could have found a way to go about disposing of someone who guns down protesters en masse and funds terrorism without inviting so much negative sentiment or economic volatility.
One of the things Iran figured out fairly quickly about Israel is that reducing their rate of fire is more effective for wearing down the population, and eroding political support for the war.
The longer Iran can keep the air raid sirens blaring in Israel, the better.
> comparison US ability to increase pressure now seems limited to threatening major war crimes (wiping out Iran's power grid and putting the country into blackout). Not to say many of Iran's actions haven't also been war crimes.
US can destroy the entire Iranian economy that rests on oil. The only thing that stopping them right now seems like a fantasy by Trump that post-war Iran will become a Venezuela. Iran could then damage the Gulf oil facilities but does not have the same capabilities to completely destroy the facilities, due to problems getting the ammunitions to the targets
> I think the truth of all of this is that the US and Israel have no way to wipe out Iran's missile and drone capabilities
Everyday Israel is bombing the entire supply chain for drones and ballistic missiles in Iran. That means the companies making the explosives, optics, fins, stabilizers, engines, etc. The amount of destruction will greatly set back the Iranian ability to replenish their stockpiles and should also affect the war in Ukraine.
Iranian ballistic missile capability, at least the long range one is limited by its amount of launchers, and these are also hunted rather effectively.
I wouldn't underestimate complete air superiority, as the ability of the US and Israel to cause damage to Iran is far greater than otherwise, and Iran entire economy is concentrated on a very small number of targets
> Iranian ballistic missile capability, at least the long range one is limited by its amount of launchers, and these are also hunted rather effectively.
The island tunnels holding many of these are problematic, which is why we are deploying troops to go tunnel hunting on the islands in the Straight.
> “For the purposes of this market, an ‘official ceasefire agreement’ requires clear public confirmation from both the United States government and the government of Iran that they have agreed to halt military hostilities against one another.” (by March 31)
Seems a rather risky bet considering how deep Israel has ventured into its war in Lebanon. Very doubtful they will stop anytime soon. Given the leverage Israel has demonstrated over US foreign policy I find it hard to imagine that the US will 'leave them to it'. Likewise, Iran is unlikely to leave Hezbollah's interests out of any negotiations or for that matter to trust that the US isn't asking for negotiations in bad faith. I guess there could be a limited ceasefire agreed between Iran and the US to make room for negotiations but the ceasefire would almost certainly have to occur without the opening of the strait or an end to fighting in Lebanon. This (now regional) war has a long way to go in my opinion.
Ultimately, I think this all hinges on whether or not the Iranians feel that they have enough leverage to exercise yet. My feeling is that they will want to continue to the point of destroying Trump's political career - something they could possibly do if this quagmire continues to get worse and closer to the US midterms. Bringing down a US president is potentially one way they can help ensure that they don't simply get attacked again in the near future.
Non-zionist Jews have been leaving Israel whenever the opportunity rose. This war was just an accelerant for further emigration.
The only ones who choose to stay back are folks fresh into Aliyah, who might've received a lot of incentives from the government to settle in the illegal West Bank settlements. Or those who really believe in Zionism. The former are typically guys who couldn't make the cut even in their home countries, so they're certainly not adequate replacements for the ones leaving.
Not to mention, it's mostly the liberal cities like Tel Aviv which have faced the brunt of Iranian barrages. Jerusalem has been barely hit. Folks staying in those cities, working actual jobs contributing to the economy and not Torah studies, are likely the ones leaving - I know many of my acquaintances who've left Tel Aviv for the US or Dubai.
I can't see it being over in a week. People seem to have not realized that the Iranian regime is large enough and possessed of enough of a sense of honor to not just surrender after a week. Plus the use of decapitation attacks makes it extremely difficult for the Iranians to talk each other down. And the US can't negotiate on behalf of Israel or bind them to not break the ceasefire, because there's a separate and much longer lasting conflict between Israel and Iran that has been going on since the revolution.
On the other hand, there is no way to "destroy Trump's career". The US system doesn't have confidence votes. You're stuck with him.
Edit: it is an unfortunate aspect of the minor World War that the Iran war has overshadowed the war in Lebanon, whatever is happening in Syria, and the weird UAE backed war in Sudan.
I get where you're coming from in a lot of ways, but the strait (edited) remains closed, and it's not just a perception issue. From this article [0]:
> U.S. officials have previously declared the Iranian Navy to have been rendered combat ineffective, but many of the more than 120 ships it has targeted so far have been larger vessels. Iran has hundreds of fast boats, some of which are armed with short-range anti-ship missiles, as well as artillery rockets and other weapons. They can also be used to lay naval mines. These fleets are inherently harder to find and fix, and do not need large ports to operate from.
Maybe that's why very few ships are still getting through. The rest of the article is a fun read about how A-10s are taking out those small boats, but there's still a whole lot of work left to do. I think Iran still has a lot of asymmetric juice left, and at some point the law of diminishing returns will kick in.
On the other hand it was a war of choice and the U.S. can make their declaration of victory look like whatever they want it to.
As Sun Tzu wrote in the Art of War (a much shittier book than Art of the Deal /s), always give your enemy a way out. Otherwise they will fight to their death...
Their drones are cheap easy to conceal, and can keep the straight closed indefinitely. And what other leverage do they have besides them keeping the straight closed?
> And what other leverage do they have besides them keeping the straight closed?
They also have the potential for Houthi involvement - threatening shipping in the Red Sea. In addition the Houthis or Iran themselves are more than capable of disabling Saudi Arabia's Red Sea port - shutting off a major relief valve for gulf oil exports.
In short, Iran has plenty of further escalation options (i.e. leverage). Not to mention the ongoing threat they present to Israel which I believe they are more than capable of increasing. If you doubt that, I would suggest searching for some of Ted Postol's commentary regarding Iran's missile attacks and Israel and the US's ability to defend against them. He is very dubious that they can and that the 80-90% intercept rates are in fact baloney. He does have prior form here - being essentially the only one to question patriot missile effectiveness vs scuds in the Iraq war. He claimed a full order of magnitude less effectiveness than reported (9% I believe) and was proven right.
> either US/Israel starts it or Iran starts it - when they get the upper hand
Iran's modern history doesn't suggest this at all. Quite the opposite - they have been continually invaded. To me, theirs seems like an explicitly defensive stance. They have no airforce, navy, or tanks and such to speak of - just missiles and drones. Not a force suited to invading other countries.
You could argue about their support for regional militia's but I still wouldn't concede that indicates any desire to start a war.
As I understand it, some of these processes also require a sufficiently large industrial base to be even remotely economical due to a reliance on industrial 'byproduct' (for want of a better word). Because of this, some of these processes are not something that can be quickly stood up in isolation over a few years. It would take concerted large scale planning over a long time period - something the Chinese system of government is almost uniquely capable of.
I foresee a possible relaxation of conditions on the strait by Iran while keeping their hand on the lever providing substantial leverage during any actual negotiations. I also note that it seems the US are considering Iranian demands - not the other way around. Even with that, Trumps' toughest negotiations may be with the Israelis.
reply